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The Future of Money and of Monetary Policy 
By C. Goodhart 
Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It has been a great honour to be asked by Vitor Constancio, whom I greatly admire, to prepare a 
paper on this subject.  But my credentials for this role are thin.  At my age, the past looms larger 
than the future.  Moreover, my forecasting skills are weak.  In my forecast world, Hillary Clinton 
would have been President, and the UK would still be a member of the EU.  Beyond that, much in 
the future will depend on technological change, particularly within the digital and electronic fields; 
but I am one of the last of the pre-electronic world.  When I went to Cambridge University in the 
1950s, there was only one computer in the whole of the University, housed in an extremely large 
room with thousands of valves connected by a spaghetti-junction of wires.  When dealing with a new 
electronic gadget, I have to ask my grandchildren how to work it.   
 
Recent Developments 
 
Nevertheless, let me set the scene.  Underlying trends have been favourable for Central Banks and 
their operational independence in recent decades.  Interest rates, both nominal and real, have 
trended down over the last thirty years.  As a result, although debt ratios for most countries and 
most sectors have been rising, with the exception of banks since 2009 and Germany, debt service 
ratios have remained low and steady, as shown in Figures 1 and 2.   
 
  
2 
 
Figure 1 
 
Figure 2 
 
Source: National sources, IMF, WB 
 
While these two figures show data for the US and the UK, much the same has been the case for 
other developed economies, notably in Europe.   
 
Borrowers, especially public sectors and non-financial corporates, have gained.  Those already 
holding assets, notably the old and the rich, have benefited.  The losers have been savers who do not 
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have initial assets, in particular the young and the poor, but these have tended to blame 
governments for their disadvantages, not so much Central Banks.   
 
The basic reason for the declining interest rates have been strong deflationary headwinds.  These 
have been largely due to a combination of demographic factors and the entry into the global trading 
system of China and Eastern Europe, the latter after the breakup of the Soviet Union.  The 
demographic factors include the passage of the post-war baby boom through the labour market, 
moving towards retirement.  This led both to an increase in the labour supply and a temporary sharp 
improvement in the dependency ratio, as the proportion of young within the population declined 
faster than the rise in the number of aged retirees.   
 
The effective labour supply more than doubled since about 1990, the greatest positive labour supply 
shock ever recorded.  The effect of this on the returns to the various factors of production were 
natural and straightforward.  The return to unskilled labour within each country declined quite 
sharply, whereas the return to management, capital and highly-skilled labour increased sharply.  
Amidst the twin pincers of potential offshoring and competitive immigration, labour market power 
declined drastically.  John Muellbauer, in his accompany paper, reported the steady decline in trade 
union density.  Why did this occur?  Because in this context of globalisation and plentiful labour, 
management had the whip hand.   
 
Future Reversal of Trends 
 
But such demographic trends are likely to reverse sharply, as the growth of the labour force slows, 
and in many countries, including many in Europe, such as Germany, actually declines.  Moreover, 
China has reached the Lewes point, when the potential source of additional labour via migration 
from the inland western provinces to eastern coast manufacturing draws to a close.  Indeed, China’s 
labour force having risen sharply, is now set to decline, as rapidly as that in Japan.  Not surprisingly, 
Chinese workers have been saving voraciously.  Although a communist company, China does not 
have much of a welfare safety net.  The one-child policy has meant that four grandparents share one 
grandchild, so the family safety net has also collapsed; and their expectation of life has risen sharply.  
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No wonder the Chinese savings ratio has been so high.  While this is, perhaps, an extreme example, 
much the same has been going on in many other similar countries, both developed and emerging.   
 
One of the most fundamental questions facing the world is whether the Indian sub-continent and 
Africa, where the demographic outlook is quite different, can take China’s place, as the future 
workshops of the world.  This latter, however, is too large, too difficult and general subject for me to 
address in this short space. 
 
But the macroeconomic headwinds of recent decades not only come from a ‘savings glut’ from the 
personal sector, but also from the fact that non-financial corporate investment has been remarkably 
low.  Indeed, the corporate sector has shifted dramatically from its historical role as a net deficit 
sector to having a net surplus.  With both the corporate and personal sectors piling up large 
surpluses, the counterpart in the world has had to be an increase in public sector deficits.  Though 
the balance between countries is, of course, dependent on their current account balance.   
 
What determines this net surplus of the corporate sector?  One of the reasons has been the overall 
slow growth of output and demand itself.  But in the context of extraordinarily low interest rates, 
and high profitability, one might nevertheless have expected much more corporate investment.  
There are several reasons that have been put forward to explain such weakness in investment; far 
from being mutually exclusive, all of the following factors may have played some role in this 
development, though how one may weight their respective influences, is too difficult for me to 
ascertain.   
 
Technology 
Perhaps the best known is the claim by Robert Gordon that all the easiest and simplest technical 
inventions have already been exploited.   Besides his well-known book on The Rise and Fall of 
American Growth, (2016), I have recently read his latest excellent NBER Working Paper on ‘Why has 
economic growth slowed when innovation appears to be accelerating?’, (2018).  It may also be true 
that the new kind of innovation in electronic/digital technology involves more reliance on human 
capital, and less expenditure on ‘real’ resources than in the past.   
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Monopoly 
A second reason that has been put forward involves a suggestion that production has become 
concentrated among a smaller number of monopolistic firms.  Again, in his earlier paper, John 
Muellbauer referred to the concept to an increasing concentration ratio.   
 
Managerial incentives 
Yet another line of argument is that the incentives of managers of public companies has become 
increasingly distorted towards raising short-term equity returns, both for shareholders in general 
and for themselves via the bonus culture in particular.  In a world of exceptionally cheap debt, the 
easiest way to do this is to borrow and use the funds to buy back equity, thereby raising the leverage 
ratio, and shifting risk from themselves and their shareholders to creditors and other stakeholders 
more widely.  My friend Andrew Smithers has written persuasively on this subject, See Smithers 
(2013).   
 
Cheap labour 
My own preferred explanation, however, reverts to the positive labour supply shock, making labour 
so extraordinarily plentiful and cheap.  If labour is so cheap, there is no need for investment, or 
managerial effort, to raise competitiveness and productivity, in order to maintain profitability.  Why 
undertake risky and tiresome exercises at a time when profitability remains so easy to attain?   
 
But, as noted earlier, this latter effect is now starting to reverse in many, perhaps most, countries, 
and will do so increasingly.   As the availability of labour (except in India and Africa) becomes 
increasingly tight, the pressures driving down inflation will reverse at some stage.  Labour power has 
been so bashed by the context of the last few decades, that the natural rate of unemployment has 
likely declined.  But there is a limit to that, and eventually the Phillips curve will come into its own 
again.  As inflation increases, monetary policy will normalise.   
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Central Banks will no longer be the best friends of borrowers, notably amongst those Ministers of 
Finance.  How will politicians react, especially populist politicians, as Central Banks start to become 
more restrictive, rather than the only expansionary ‘game in town’.  In view of the increasing claims 
on the public purse of the growing army of the aged, with their needs for medical help, the fiscal 
outlook looks grim.  If populist politicians allow fiscal expansion, how will they react to Central Banks 
stepping on the brakes of a ‘people’s car’ which they want to accelerate faster?  There are reasons 
to believe that the glory years of Central Bank independence are in the past, not the future.   
 
And how will Central Banks handle the insolvencies in corporates, and some over-levered 
households, as interest rates start to rise back up.  The figures for debt ratios are so extreme that it 
is difficult to believe that Central Banks could apply either a rapid, or any extensive, rise in nominal 
interest rates without running into the danger of insolvency crises.   
 
Have Central Bankers got themselves into a ‘debt trap’?  Given the context of the Great Financial 
Crisis (GFC), it was both right and inevitable that Central Banks would continue to lower interest to 
the Zero Lower Bound and hold them there.  But this had the effect, indeed the intended effect, of 
encouraging further expansions of debt.  Although the GFC was perceived as a financial crisis due to 
excessive leverage, especially in banks, the medication applied has had the effect of encouraging 
debt ratios, aside from banks, to rise sharply thereafter.  We may have reached a point where debt 
ratios are so high that interest rates have to be kept at historically extremely low levels, thereby 
encouraging even more accumulation of further debt.   
 
How can we get out of this debt trap?   
 
Growth 
Unfortunately the demographic forces outlined earlier will prevent this, even if productivity should 
recover.  The growth of labour forces in many of our countries will start to decline.  In Japan, the 
labour force over the last decade has been declining at about 1% per annum; but real growth has 
been rising at about 1% also.  So output per worker has been growing at a rate of about 2% per year.  
This latter is far better than in most other developed economies.  We will be very fortunate if we can 
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match the experience of Japan in future decades.  Demography probably means that we cannot 
expect real growth to be more than about 1.5% per annum over future decades. 
 
Cancel debt 
It so happened that the conference when this paper was presented occurred at the same time as the 
two Italian parties, the Northern League and the Five Star Movement, were trying to agree a 
program.  Initially one of their proposals was that the Italian debt now held by the European Central 
Bank be cancelled.  Indeed, quite a number of voices have argued that, since we owe the debt 
largely to ourselves, why do we not just cancel it?  Indeed, that did take place in some of the earliest 
historical societies, such as in Babylonia and Sumeria.  I had considerable pleasure in joining up with 
an economic historian specialising in such early antiquarian history, Michael Hudson, to prepare a 
paper outlining how the early Debt Jubilees worked, whereby the debt owed largely to the royal 
family by the working peasant population was cancelled; and then to explain why, in my view, a 
similar exercise could not be undertaken under the changed societal structure that we have today, 
but that other alternative mechanisms might be found to reach the same objective.  It would take 
far too long to explain all this again now, but it can be found in our joint 2018 paper on Debt 
Jubilees.   
 
Inflation 
For the reasons already set out, in my view, the underlying fundamental forces tending towards 
deflation, will be replaced by similar forces leading to more inflationary pressures.  Also see Juselius 
and Takats (2018).  And the rise of populism, whose appeal has been largely based on the dismal 
returns to the bottom 50% of our working population, will spur that on further.  There are already 
comments to be heard differentiating between ‘good inflation’ and ‘bad inflation’.  
 
The call to raise the inflation target in recent years was always seemed odd, given that Central Banks 
have had such difficult in hitting even the lower 2% target, and the loss of credibility that such a 
change in targetry would entail.  But as inflationary pressures recur again, perhaps the simplest way 
out for politicians, at least in those cases where the legislature can control the Central Bank (not the 
ECB), would be simply to raise the target in line with such enhanced pressures.  Only in the case of 
8 
 
the ECB is Central Bank independence protected by treaty.  Elsewhere the popular ‘will of the 
people’ may prevail, rightly or wrongly.   
 
Default 
Of course, unforeseen inflation is a form of default.  Only in such cases where foreigners hold a large 
proportion of debt is default likely.  Let us hope that it does not become too common.   
 
Debt restructuring 
Otherwise known as ‘extend and pretend’, this is likely to be increasingly employed, but it is a 
palliative, and limited in effect.   
 
Switch to equity finance 
This would be my preferred solution.  It would involve manifold legal and structural changes, notably 
to eliminate or even reverse, the fiscal advantages of debt over equity finance, it would probably 
entail an accompanying series of reforms to corporate governance and to the way that corporate 
information is now publicly provided, i.e. the auditing process.  But, again, this is too large a subject 
to be addressed here, though I hope to expand on it in future work. 
 
Money, Debt and Information 
 
Why do we use debt as the basis of money creation?  In particular, debt has important informational 
advantages.  There is no need to know the details of the borrower’s condition, as long as payment is 
regularly made.  Moreover, debt repayment is supported by the surrender of collateral and 
bankruptcy penalties.  This contrasts with the relative opacity of equity control over the residual 
profitability of an enterprise.  However, debt finance has numerous disadvantages.  Taking a 
constant flow of payments, irrespective of the underlying conditions and context of the borrower, is 
hardly ethical.  All the great religions of the world have preferred equity sharing as a financing 
mechanism, rather than straight debt finance.  Moreover, the widespread introduction of corporate 
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limited liability has led to massive moral hazard, as the upside is retained by the shareholders, while 
the downside gets shifted to fixed-interest creditors and other stakeholders.  The present system 
leads to excessive corporate debt, non-linearities and crises.   
 
Could the explosion of big data, and perhaps changes in accountancy conventions, enable a shift to 
equity finance via participation, for example in the form of Islamic Banking.  There is the well-known 
story of entrepreneurs having three sets of books, one for the taxman, one for the other 
shareholders, and the true one for managerial insiders.  At the moment, managerial insiders have a 
massive informational advantage over everyone else, except perhaps institutional holders of very 
large blocks of shares.  Only if technological advantages allow information to be more commonly 
shared and widely available, could one expect a major shift towards equity finance.   
 
Money as an Informational System 
 
The need for money is closely related to informational problems.  If people do not know whether X 
will repay her debt, a claim on X cannot be used to pay for purchases from Y.  So, what one needs in 
order to obtain a means of payment is to replace the uncertain-value claim on X with a claim on Z, 
with the latter being a much stronger debtor, in most cases the head of state, (or an asset, such as 
gold, whose value has been guaranteed by Z).  Note that high-value metals, such as gold and silver, 
are extremely difficult to use as a medium of exchange, unless their metallurgical content has been 
guaranteed by the stamp of authority, i.e. a coin.  Recall the difficulty that Charlie Chaplin had in 
using gold dust to buy drinks in a pub in the Yukon, in the film The Gold Rush.  In order to use 
precious metals as a means of payment, their fineness has to be somehow attested.   
 
So, we can think of money as an information system.  But monetary systems can be organised to 
incorporate more or less information on counterparties to a transaction.   
 
Some forms of money involve little information on counterparties.  These include currency and, by 
construction, cryptocurrencies.  Problems with both of these are that the lack of counterparty 
information makes them particularly attractive for anti-social uses in the grey/black economies.  And 
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currency also has the feature that it limits the ability to allow the authorities to introduce negative 
interest rates.  This latter constraint is probably exaggerated, in the sense that the main objection to 
negative interest rates will always be political.  The suggestion that the authorities want to make 
your savings worth less period by period is never likely to be a political selling point.   
 
On the other hand, certain monetary systems involve considerable information about 
counterparties, in particular centralised ledger systems.  The problem with such high information 
systems is that they can be used for authoritarian purposes, especially by governments.   
 
Essentially the question for societies is how much information do we want others to have on our 
financial transactions, and then perhaps to use to their own advantages?   
 
It may be most efficient for the government, perhaps in the guise of its Central Bank, to be in a 
position to know all our financial transactions.  But, even if we were entirely upright citizens, and 
very few of us are fully such, are we confident that the government, and with it the Central Bank, 
may not fall into the hands of authoritarian, dictatorial and corrupt hands?   
 
How about the tech companies?  But their business model is to finance the provision of services to 
individual users by selling information to third parties, whose use of such information most of us are 
barely aware of.  The recent example of Facebook’s use of our information must act as a warning 
about whether we want our financial information to become subject to uses outside of our control. 
 
In many ways commercial banks have been well behaved in using the information that their 
command over the majority of our monetary system has given them.  While there have been a few 
cases of such misuse, they have been rare.  It would, in my view, be dangerous to pursue efficiency 
at the expense of privacy.   
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Central Bank E-money 
 
There is considerable interest in whether Central Banks might issue digital currency, e-money, to a 
much wider range of agents in the economy, perhaps to everyone.  It should, however, be noted 
that this would sharply reverse the concordat that became implicitly agreed between commercial 
banks and Central Banks at the beginning of the 20th century.  This was that the commercial banks 
on their part would accept overall monetary control and increasing supervisory oversight by the 
Central Bank, whereas in return the Central Bank would abstain from direct commercial competition 
with the commercial banks.  Unless carefully managed, the issue of digital currency by Central Banks 
might bring them directly into competition with the commercial banks. 
 
What can Central Banks offer on this front that commercial banks cannot?  See, for example, the 
excellent BIS report, by Bech and Garratt (2017).  One of both the main advantages, and 
disadvantages, of Central Bank money, is that it would involve significantly less credit risk than 
claims on commercial banks.  In normal times, the interest rate offered by commercial banks, and 
their other services, notably access to credit, would probably make most clients prefer to hold their 
monetary balances with commercial banks.  But in potential crises, this could change in the flash of 
an eye.  In his accompanying paper, Brunnermeier refers to financial practices where micro 
prudence may lead to macro disaster.  This could be the case were Central Banks to offer available 
accounts to all-comers.  The switch out of commercial banks into the safety of the Central Bank 
could provide ‘the mother of all runs’.  Moreover, if there should be a major shift of monetary 
financing out of commercial banks into the Central Bank, what would be the counterpart assets that 
the Central Bank would hold?  If they hold only public sector debt, the public sector will benefit, but 
the private sector will equivalently lose access to credit, or find it only available on significantly 
worse terms.  For a Central Bank to hold large volumes of private sector debt is problematical, for 
obvious political reasons.  The way that the present monetary system has been set up involves 
significant, partly hidden, subsidies and advantages to private sector borrowers.  They would be 
loath to lose these. 
 
There are, indeed, possible efficiency benefits from the issue of Central Bank digital money; for 
example, there may be lower transaction costs than relying on currency; the Riksbank seems to think 
so.  Perhaps more important, cross-currency financial transactions are currently expensive and 
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inefficiently done. Think of the spread on exchanging currencies.  Could digital currencies improve 
international monetary transmission?   
 
Nevertheless, my own assessment would be that the dangers involved in having Central Banks move 
to widespread provision of digital currencies to all potential clients still outweighs their potential 
advantages.  
 
Bibliogaphy 
 
Bech, M., and R. Garratt, (2017), ‘Central Bank Cryptocurrencies’, BIS Quarterly Review, September. 
Goodhart, C.A.E., and M. Hudson, (2018), ‘Could/Should Jubilee Debt Cancellations be Reintroduced 
Today?’, CEPR Discussion Paper DP12605, 16 January. 
Gordon, R.J., (2016), The Rise and Fall of American Growth:  The U.S. Standard of Living Since the Civil 
War, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Gordon, R.J., (2018), ‘Why has Economic Growth Slowed when Innovation Appears to be 
Accelerating?’, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 24554, April. 
Juselius, M., and E. Takats, (2018), ‘The Enduring Link between Demography and Inflation’, Bank for 
International Settlements Working Paper 722, May. 
Smithers, A., (2013), The Road to Recovery: How and Why Economic Policy Must Change, John Wiley 
& Sons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
